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This study investigates the relationships between several key economic, sociodemographic 
and infrastructural factors and crime in South Africa. Using the five March waves, 2003 to 
2007, of the Labour Force Survey and crime statistics for the five-year period from April 
2003 to March 2008 from the South African Police Service, this paper examines factors 
associated with aggregate property and violent crime rates at the district council level. The 
study uses pooled OLS and province fixed effects to estimate a reduced form equation. The 
coefficient on unemployment is initially found to be insignificant; however, after dividing 
the measure into youth and mature unemployment, a positive relationship between youth 
unemployment and both violent and property crime is revealed. Although, no significant 
relationship between income inequality and crime, even after decomposing the measure 
into between- and within-racial group components is found, racial heterogeneity within a 
district, perhaps a better measure of wealth inequality is found to be significant, with a 
particularly strong relationship with property crimes. Furthermore, holding all else 
constant, districts with a larger proportion of males and people aged between 15 and 35, 
on average experience more violent crimes per capita. Lastly, the number of police stations 
per capita is found to have a positive relationship with property crime, suggesting that 
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Over the past two decades, crime has become entrenched in the social landscape of South 
Africa. It has permeated the lives of all and affects many aspects of life. Beyond the direct 
effect on safety and lowering the utility of civilians, it has broader social and economic 
implications.  
Crime increases the risks and costs of conducting business, and thus detracts investment 
by either deflecting resources towards security or making it unprofitable to invest entirely 
(Demombynes and Özler, 2005). This is not only relevant to the formal sector; crime has 
been found to be one of the largest perceived barriers to starting informal business in 
urban townships (Cichello et al., 2006; Devey et al., 2005; Kingdon and Knight, 2007), 
thus blocking a channel for upward social mobility.  
The level of human capital is, also, negatively affected; crime is noted as being one of the 
greatest determinants driving the emigration of skilled professionals and, simultaneously, 
inhibits the immigration of skilled foreigners (Demombynes and Özler, 2005). Furthermore, 
rampant street crime can deter children from attending school and increase the associated 
opportunity costs of education, thus limiting human capital accumulation (Silverman, 
2004).  
At the public level, resources are diverted from other development imperatives towards the   
prevention of crime, enforcement of the law and correctional services. In the 2005/06 South 
African budget, R43,6 billion was allocated to the criminal justice system, representing 
10,4% of the national budget (Altbeker, 2005). Moreover, violent crime has placed a 
burden on the health system, by weighing on the capacity of the trauma wards in public 
hospitals with inflicted injuries (Petra Brysiewicz, 2001)  
Since Becker (1968) first attempted to model criminal behaviour, there has been much 
research on the factors behind an individual’s choice to commit crime (Calvó-Aremengol 
and Zenou, 2004; Imai and Krishna, 2004; Lochner, 2004; Silverman 2004; Verdier and 
Zenou 2004) and the drivers of aggregate crime rates (D’Allesso et al., 2002; Demombynes 
and Özler, 2005; Durlaf et al., 2010; Ehrlich, 1973; Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Imrohoroglu et 
al., 2004; Levitt, 1997). The literature has attempted to merge social and economic theory 











The purpose of this paper is to investigate the ability of various sociodemographic, 
economic and infrastructural characteristics have in explaining the variation of crime 
across different districts in South Africa.  
First, studies, which have attempted to model crime, are reviewed in section II, after which 
the construction and sources of the data used in this paper are described in section III. 
Section IV discusses the methodology and presents a motivation for the variable choice. 
The results of the regressions are presented in section V, followed by a discussion in 












II. REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES 
This section reviews pertinent studies, which model crime both on the aggregate and from 
the perspective of the individual. The first focus is on the studies, which have researched 
social and economic relationships with aggregate crime rates. These are used to establish a 
framework for the identification strategy employed in this paper. The second part 
introduces studies, which have modelled crime from the perspective of the individual, 
which are used to inform on the variable choice in section V. 
Demombynes and Özler (2005) use cross sectional data from 1996 to determine the main 
factors driving crime in South Africa. In particular their aim is to analyse the effect that 
inequality, within- and between-racial groups, has on violent and property crime rates. 
They theorise that variations in welfare drive crime through three channels. Firstly, the 
differential in returns to legitimate and illegitimate activities incentivise or disincentivise 
criminal behaviour. Secondly, the lack of social mobility of the poor leads to moral 
disintegration and unrest. Lastly, different levels of investment in private security result in 
a spread of crime not indicative of possible gain from committing crime.  
Households from the 1996 South African census are matched with precincts from the crime 
statistics for 1996 reported by SAPS, after which economic variables are generated using 
data from the October Household Survey and Income expenditure survey. The analysis 
takes place at the precinct level, however, variables generated for a neighbourhood around 
each precinct are included. This presents a problem, as the economic variables generated 
may not be a true representation of the conditions of a precinct. Both the IES and OHS 
have a sample of about 30 000 households, which may suffer from a sampling bias at the 
precinct level. 
Nevertheless, Demombynes and Özler focus on six different crimes, of which they 
categorise four into two different groups, property crimes and violent crimes, while leaving 
murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances uncategorised. They estimate the 
relationships between these crimes and different welfare measures using a negative 
binomial regression model, as well as OLS. They find that both models produce similar 
results.  
They find that within-racial group inequality is highly correlated with property crimes, 












proxy for wealth, in a precinct, which is argued to represent returns from crime, is 
positively correlated with property crime. Furthermore, if a precinct is the wealthiest in its 
neighbourhood, on average there will be more property crimes, suggesting that inequality 
between precincts is an important determinant.  
They find that violent crime is associated with higher levels of inequality in the criminal 
catchment area of precincts, rather than inequality at the precinct level. Mean expenditure 
of a precinct has a non-linear relationship with violent crime, having an inverted U-shape 
relationship.  
Additionally, they find that unemployment is uncorrelated with violent crime, except in 
the case of murder. Interestingly, despite the findings that between-racial group inequality 
is uncorrelated with crime, racial heterogeneity in a precinct is highly correlated with all 
types of crime.  
Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) attempt to model the movements in aggregate property crime 
rates in the USA for the period 1980 to 1996. During this time, the USA experienced a 
large decrease in the property crime rates. They conjecture that the decrease was a result 
of increased spending on law enforcement, lower overall unemployment, higher earnings 
and fewer unskilled workers. However, during the same period, youth unemployment and 
inequality rose considerably.  
To try and explain the movements in crime, Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) create a model and 
calibrate it using data from 1980. Similarly to Demombynes and Özler’s results, they find 
that aggregate unemployment does not have a large impact on crime. Rather than 
unemployment, the model shows that the most important factors driving the decrease in 
crime were the aging population, the stronger economy and the increased probability of 
apprehension.  
However, the two strongest relationships with property crime that were uncovered in the 
study were inequality and the probability of apprehension, with the effect of inequality 
being larger. This suggests that if inequality had stayed constant over the period from 
1980 to 1996, the USA would have seen even larger decreases in the crime rate. Two other 
noteworthy findings of the model and that are supported by the data, are that 
approximately half of those who commit crime do not have a high school education and 












Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) suggest that adding a variable that accounts for social networks 
and an indicator for social stigma will explain the decrease in the crime rate better. This is 
in accordance with Imai and Krishna’s (2004) theory on criminal history hurting future 
employment opportunities, but contrary to Silverman’s (2004) thesis on street crime and 
reputation, which is discussed in greater detail on page six. 
Unlike Imrohoroglu et al.’s (2004) focus on property crime, Fajnzylber et al. (2002) 
attempt to disentangle the causes of violent crime. They do this by using panel data from 
45 countries for the period 1970 to 1994. Using country level rates for intentional homicide 
and robbery, they estimate the explanatory power of economic, social, demographic and 
institutional variables.  
Their results show that increases in income inequality are associated with higher violent 
crime rates, crime trends are countercyclical and that there is a great level of criminal 
inertia. However, it is important to note that cross country analyses may not produce 
accurate relationships, as such a high level of aggregation disallows an in depth analysis of 
local determinants. Though, further support for this relationship has been found by an 
intra-city study by Scorzafave and Soares (2009), who find that income inequality has a 
very strong relationship with property crimes in the Brazilian city of São Paulo. 
Common in the above aggregate studies, are the findings that there is a significant 
relationship between inequality and crime, while unemployment does not seem to bare 
much importance. A study by Levitt (1997) on the effects of policing in the USA, also 
found that while unemployment has a meagre effect on property crime, it did not appear 
to have any significant relationship with violent crime. 
There have been a number of studies modelling the individual’s choice to commit crime. 
Although this study’s focus is on aggregate crime levels, the individual behavioural models 
are important, as they advise the variable choice for the aggregate model. What 
determines the individual’s choice of whether or not to commit a crime will inevitably 
drive the choice for many individuals, thus determining the crime rate.  
The investigated studies, model the individual’s choice as a cost-benefit analysis (Imai and 
Krishna, 2004; Lochner, 2004; Silverman, 2004; Verdier and Zenou, 2004). If the expected 
benefit of the crime outweighs the expected cost, then the individual will commit the 












There is a general consensus that earning a low wage or no wage at all decreases the 
opportunity cost of crime and that if other people are wealthier; the expected payoff of 
crime is higher (Imai and Krishna, 2004; Lochner, 2004; Verdier and Zenou, 2004). 
Furthermore, education has been accepted to increase the opportunity cost of crime, by 
inducing higher expected wages and social conditioning (Lochner, 2004). 
However, the role of social capital is less certain. Silverman (2004) asserts that greater 
social capital and connectivity is associated with a greater benefit of committing crime. He 
suggests a theory of reputation, where people engage in crime to develop a reputation that 
will protect them from being a victim of crime themselves. Thus, in a community with 
greater social connectivity, the signal developed by engaging in crime is better 
communicated than in one where people are less likely to know each other. 
To the contrary, Imai and Krishna (2004) state that social capital increases the cost of 
committing crime through stigmatization. As with Silverman’s theory of reputation, Imai 
and Krishna base their theory on the increased ability of a tight-nit community to identify 
a criminal. They argue that the cost of committing a crime is higher for a person in a well-
connected community, as criminals are viewed to be less productive, thus their future 
potential employment and wages are negatively affected. Additionally, they assert that 
criminals are more likely to be alienated or reported to the authorities in communities with 
a stronger social network. 
Verdier and Zenou (2004) maintain that race is an important determinant of one’s 
engagement in criminal activities, even after controlling for other social and economic 
factors. They assert that this is a result of statistical discrimination and how it becomes a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. However, D’Allesso et al. (2002) find that this does not extend to 
violent crimes in the USA. 
The following section discusses the construction of the data and provides summary 














The data used in this paper are constructed by merging crime statistics, collected from the 
South African Police Service (SAPS) website, with the Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 
2003 to 2007.  
South African crime statistics are released annually and are made available to the public 
on the SAPS website. The data are collected from all 1127 precincts1 yearly for the period 
April to March and the first available year of statistics is 2003. Crimes are grouped into 24 
main categories with six subcategories for aggravated robbery; however, only four of the 
subcategories are available at precinct level, with street and bank robberies only being 
available at provincial level.  
During the five-year period April 2003 and March 2008, there have been multiple changes 
to the names of police stations, as well as the ceding and establishment of new police 
stations. All stations established after April 2008, of which there are 12, are dropped from 
the sample, as they record zeros for all crimes before their creation. Twenty-three new 
stations were established between April 2003 and March 2008, while there was no merging 
of precincts during the same period. 
Aggregate demographic, sociodemographic and economic variables were generated using 
five March waves of the LFS for the period 2003 to 2007. The LFS is a biannual household 
survey of 74 591 adults of working age in 30 000 households across South Africa. The main 
purpose of the survey is to collect data on the South African labour market. It was run 
from 2000 to 2007 when the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) eventually succeeded 
it.  
The LFS is recorded at the district council level, of which there were 51 during the time 
frame investigated. These included six metropolitan areas. The 1 115 police precincts were 
matched to their respective district council. This was achieved by downloading a map 
overlay of the district councils for Google Earth™ from the Municipal Demarcation Board’s 
website and searching for each police station’s geographical location.  
Once the police station was found, it was recoded as a match to the district council. In the 
rare case where a precinct straddled district councils, the district in which the police 
                                                












station was located is preferred. The sample consists of 51 districts and five years, making 
a pooled sample of 255.  














This section introduces the reduced-form specification to be estimated in section V. A 
motivation for the specification is provided, along with a discussion on each regressand and 
regressor. Furthermore, an explanation of how each variable is constructed is offered. 
The foundation of the aggregate crime model presented in this paper is based on Becker’s 
(1968) assertion that rational individuals decided whether to commit crime based on a 
thought-out cost-benefit2 analysis. However, the factors influencing one individual’s choice, 
will influence other individuals’ choices as well, and thus affect the aggregate crime rate. 
Furthermore, the decisions of others to engage in crime will have a feedback effect and 
alter the costs and benefits of crime for the individual. Thus, each variable included in the 
reduced-form is justified by how it affects the individual’s decision to engage in crime.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between district level conditions 
and crime and establish the relative importance of such conditions. Thus, a reduced-form 
specification is used to estimate these relations. 
𝐶!"# = 𝐸!"𝛽! + 𝑆!"𝛽! + 𝐼!"𝛽! + λ!   + 𝜀!"# (1) 
The Cijt represents the logged crime rate ‘i’, where i is either ‘p’ (property) or ‘v’ (violent), 
for the jth district council during time period ‘t’. The conditions for district ‘j’ at time ‘t’ 
are split into matrices Ejt, Sjt and Ijt, which contain economic, sociodemographic and 
infrastructural variables respectively.  
To control for the unobserved heterogeneity between provinces, such as local crime 
preferences, the level of government involvement and other unobserved institutional 
factors, a fixed-effect estimator for provinces, λ k, is included. Finally, εijt represents the 




                                                
2 This paper does not assume that all costs and benefits are pecuniary and that other non-pecuniary flows, 













This paper examines both violent and property crime. Composite rates are constructed for 
both using the SAPS’s definitions with a few adaptions.  
The property crime index contains: Burglary at non-residential premises, Burglary at 
residential premises, Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle, Theft out of or from motor 
vehicle and Stock-theft.  
In this paper violent crime is defined, as crime from which there is no obvious pecuniary 
gain. Murder, Total Sexual Crimes, Attempted murder, Assault with the intent to inflict 
grievous bodily harm and Common assault are included in the index. Common Robbery 
and Robbery with aggravating circumstances are omitted, as these crimes are likely 
motivated by the prospect of pecuniary gain. 
Independents 
This paper examines three aggregate groups of conditions: (i) economic, (ii) 
sociodemographic, and (iii) infrastructural, into which the selected variables are divided. 
Each group, and the variables it contains, are discussed below. 
 (i) Economic variables 
Economic variables are defined, in this study, as any variable, which is a direct 
measure of the level of welfare in a district. These variables can affect the expected 
benefits and opportunity costs associated with engaging in criminal activities. 
Income  
The average household income per capita is used as a proxy for wealth. The 
relationship between income and crime is not clear, as income could have opposing 
effects on crime. On the one hand, a higher level of income increases the possible 
reward associated with committing crime, while on the other, higher levels of 
income increase the opportunity cost of crime and decrease the need to generate 
wealth through criminal activities.  
Furthermore, agents at a higher wealth level may choose to dedicate more resources 












costs of committing crime in an area with more wealthy households (Demombynes 
and Özler, 2005).  
An initial look at the two-way scatter plots shows a positive relationship between 
mean household income per capita and both crime indices. 
  
Figure 1. Scatter plots illustrating relationship between mean household income per capita and crime  
Unemployment 
Despite the literature’s findings that unemployment is uncorrelated with crime 
(Demombynes and Özler, 2005; Imrohoroglu et al., 2004), there is reason to believe 
that unemployment should be associated with higher property crime rates. If an 
individual is unemployed, they have lower opportunity costs and a greater need for 
income than the employed.  
It is suggested that youth unemployment may be associated with crime, while 
aggregate unemployment is not (Demombynes and Özler, 2005; Imrohoroglu et al., 
2004). Thus, two different specifications of unemployment will be used in the 
empirical analysis of this study. Unemployment will be divided into youth and 
mature unemployment. 
Inequality 
The main assertion behind the finding that inequality is associated with higher 
crime rates is that the differential in wealth results in high payoffs for the poor 
stealing from the rich. However, this does not provide a theory behind inequality’s 
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Persistent inequality may lead to social unrest and resentment, thus increasing the 
non-pecuniary benefit associated with harming the wealthy (Demombynes and 
Özler, 2005). The level of social unrest and resentment may be intensified by the 
sensitivity towards inequality between groups, such as race. 
This study uses the Theil measure of inequality, calculated using average household 
income per capita. The Theil measure is chosen above other measures, such as the 
gini coefficient for its ability to be decomposed into within- and between-group 
components. 
Education  
The impact of education on the decision to commit a crime is multifaceted. Firstly, 
higher levels of education are associated with higher wages (Lochner, 2004). Thus, 
assuming that committing a crime takes time away from other productive activities, 
the opportunity cost of committing such crime will be higher for individuals with a 
higher level of education.  
Furthermore, schools not only provide productivity enhancing education or a signal 
to employers, but also offer a platform for social and moral moulding (Lochner, 
2004). Hence, schooling may increase the guilt cost of committing crime and lower 
the non-pecuniary gain from engaging in violence. Finally, the youth engage in 
crime more than any other age group (Demombynes and Özler, 2004; Imrohoroglu 
et al., 2004), thus keeping teenagers in school will limit the range of possible 
criminal activities available to them. There is possible reverse causality, as crime, in 
particular street crime, may inhibit the youth’s ability to attend school. 
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The mean number of completed years of education is used in this analysis. 
Surprisingly, the scatter plots illustrate a positive relationship. However, without 
controlling for any other economic factors, it is likely that education is absorbing 
the role of other pertinent variables, such as inequality. 
(ii) Sociodemographic variables 
A sociodemographic variable is one, which describes the demographic or social 
makeup of a district. The sociodemographic make-up of a community determines 
the social behaviour of the agent and their interactions with others. Furthermore, 
the sociodemographic characteristics of an individual can indicate or influence their 
preference for crime. 
Age and Gender 
Age is widely cited as an important determinant of one’s preference to engage in 
criminal activities (Demombynes and Özler, 2005; Imai and Krishna, 2004; 
Imrohoroglu et al., 2004; Levitt, 1997; Lochner, 2004). Therefore, a youth variable is 
included. The variable used is the percentage of people between the ages 15 and 35 
within a district.  
Gender has also shown to be a powerful indicator of one’s probability to commit 
crime (Imai and Krishna, 2004). Almost all criminals arrested in the USA are male 
(Imrohoroglu et al., 2004); hence this study includes the percentage of males living 
in a district. As can be seen in the scatter plot (figure 3), there appears to be some 
positive relationship between gender composition and crime. 
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Racial and Linguistic Make-up  
The racial make-up of the districts is taken into account to provide a measure of 
financial support networks. Wealth is still highly correlated with race in South 
Africa. Furthermore, social networks in South Africa are cited to still be heavily 
determined on racial lines (Adato et al., 2006). These social networks are important, 
as the implications of becoming unemployed or losing income can be cushioned by 
financial support from others in your social network (Adato et al., 2006). Thus, it is 
hypothesised that districts with larger populations of weaker financial social 
groupings will experience higher crime rates; this is investigated in the regression 
analysis. 
 
Figure 4 Percentage African in a district 
In figure 4, plotting the percentage of Africans in a district against crime, a slight 
inverted U-pattern can be seen. This could indicate that racial heterogeneity is 
associated with higher crime rates and is masking the effects of the social support 
network hypothesized above. 
This phenomenon, also found by Demombynes and Özler (2005), may be explained 
by an individual’s preference to commit a crime against someone belonging to a 
different patent group over someone belonging to their own group. If an individual 
feels a sense of belonging, they may associate more guilt with committing a crime 
against someone belonging to there own group. This may be exacerbated by South 
Africa’s racial history and oppression. Another possibility is that race may be a 
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To control for this an index of racial homogeneity is generated using the sum of the 
squared percentages of the racial groups. An additional measure is included for 
linguistic heterogeneity to test whether the preference hypothesis extends to less 
patent features. 
Crime Rate and Population density 
Population density is used as a proxy for number of criminal opportunities, which is 
expected to raise crime rates. A lagged variable for the crime rate is included to test 
for the persistence of crime in a district. 
(iii) Infrastructural variables  
Variables relating to government involvement are labelled as infrastructural. The 
amount of enforcement and investment by government will impact on the costs and 
benefits of crime. 
Police 
The SAPS do not release the number of active officers per police station or 
expenditure by station; therefore, to account for the level of enforcement, the 
number of police stations per capita is used as a rough measure. There is likely to 
be an issue of endogeneity, as noted by Levitt (1997), which can be seen in the 
scatter plot (figure 5), particularly for violent crime. 
 


























































To control for the level of government service delivery, a proxy is used. This proxy 
is the percentage of households that have needed to collect water in the past week. 
Low levels of infrastructure can result in lower living standards and thus, may 
increase the associated benefit of committing crime.  
Table 1 Summary Statistics of Sample 
Above is a table containing the summary statistics for the variables of interest. The figures 
are the mean statistics for all districts for each year. The next section presents the results 
of the pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions, with different specifications.
2003 Std.%Dev. 2004 Std.%Dev. 2005 Std.%Dev. 2006 Std.%Dev. 2007 Std.%Dev.
CRIME
Violent(crime(per(100(000(people 1665.602 ( 1076.716 ) 1534.979 ( 843.7142 ) 1310.421 ( 617.7342 ) 1256.559 ( 585.9224 ) 1198.443 ( 588.5813 )
Property(crime(per(100(000(people 1451.107 ( 937.8034 ) 1221.646 ( 672.2209 ) 1093.839 ( 535.7701 ) 1055.166 ( 508.9711 ) 1007.744 ( 483.9624 )
ECONOMIC
Average(HH(income(per(capita 275.5394 ( 118.9182 ) 307.504 ( 120.8652 ) 311.4364 ( 97.92978 ) 335.2499 ( 105.0601 ) 376.8295 ( 105.595 )
Unemployment((Broad) .2643652 ( .0639209 ) .258346 ( .0706688 ) .2534425 ( .0544981 ) .2414537 ( .0565789 ) .2379953 ( .0515699 )
Youth3Unemployment .3151549 ( .0648541 ) .3157577 ( .1036884 ) .2941628 ( .0561197 ) .2804129 ( .0522196 ) .2822528 ( .060809 )
Mature3Unemployment .2461976 ( .0766524 ) .2378456 ( .0809459 ) .2395181 ( .0657491 ) .2287152 ( .0750184 ) .2226362 ( .0625709 )
Theil(index(of(inequality .9351139 ( .1920228 ) .9121456 ( .1881772 ) .9701698 ( .1835101 ) .9544193 ( .1824012 ) .9130822 ( .1445605 )
Within@race3component .783536 ( .2199574 ) .7790651 ( .2169791 ) .8491531 ( .1926004 ) .8087041 ( .1921511 ) .7857407 ( .1711701 )
Between@race3component .2206637 ( .1425305 ) .2005921 ( .1442545 ) .1882058 ( .1172068 ) .2169387 ( .1226475 ) .1862828 ( .1268405 )
Average(years(of(Education 6.89147 ( 1.163586 ) 6.923225 ( 1.298267 ) 6.893144 ( .9991257 ) 7.022908 ( .9891925 ) 7.138097 ( .9817302 )
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC
%(of(the(population(between(15(and(35 .3732114 ( .0361594 ) .3714008 ( .0405485 ) .3710958 ( .0305212 ) .3719609 ( .0306863 ) .3696361 ( .032996 )
Average(Age 26.36035 ( 2.137023 ) 26.29477 ( 2.215825 ) 26.41875 ( 1.967778 ) 26.6366 ( 1.982838 ) 26.80041 ( 2.014528 )
%(Male .4911982 ( .0296615 ) .4900842 ( .0274414 ) .4885146 ( .0222362 ) .4892484 ( .0217641 ) .4860799 ( .024478 )
%(African( .7403542 ( .2895299 ) .7481987 ( .2875483 ) .7487478 ( .2903332 ) .7521495 ( .2874903 ) .751057 ( .2885076 )
%(Coloured .1554799 ( .2574319 ) .1485198 ( .2518874 ) .1536173 ( .2595151 ) .1531912 ( .2565043 ) .1549773 ( .2599423 )
%(Indian .0132086 ( .0345633 ) .0134165 ( .0355533 ) .0137267 ( .0316035 ) .0132115 ( .029459 ) .0128755 ( .028737 )
%(White .0909573 ( .0803038 ) .089865 ( .0822144 ) .0839082 ( .0676793 ) .0814478 ( .0675151 ) .0810902 ( .0647533 )
Population(Density 160.5387 ( 332.4031 ) 162.0624 ( 338.2522 ) 179.1619 ( 403.1506 ) 186.4878 ( 429.1512 ) 189.0632 ( 433.8675 )
Index(of(Racial(Homongeneity .7353952 ( .2037931 ) .7412471 ( .2077242 ) .7455884 ( .1914593 ) .7468588 ( .1904718 ) .7476161 ( .1896808 )
Index(of(Linguistic(Homogeneity( .5922335 ( .2528743 ) .6024526 ( .2563984 ) .5995204 ( .2425191 ) .603777 ( .2455439 ) .5930903 ( .2423528 )
INFRASTRUCTURAL
Stations(per(1000(people 21.45098 ( 10.97509 ) 21.64706 ( 11.26201 ) 21.70588 ( 11.31953 ) 21.78431 ( 11.30896 ) 21.86275 ( 11.35961 )













The following section presents the regression output and provides variations of the 
specification. 
Table 2 presents the results from running the pooled OLS regression in column 1 and 2, 
after which province fixed effects are included in columns 3 to 6, with an additional control 
for the two-year lagged crime rate in column 5 and 6. All coefficients except those on the 
measures of inequality, years of education and stations per capita can be interpreted as 
elasticities. Robust standard errors have been used to control for heteroskedasticity. 
Table 2 Pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions 
 















Average Household Income per capita (log) -0.218** -0.184* -0.210** -0.158 -0.107 -0.0890
(0.0890) (0.108) (0.0756) (0.0975) (0.183) (0.149)
Unemployment -0.754 -0.531 0.0326 -0.318 -0.925 -1.026
(0.766) (0.607) (0.953) (0.765) (0.900) (0.752)
Theil index of Inequality 0.249* 0.259* 0.132 0.156 0.0811 0.117
(0.137) (0.148) (0.110) (0.136) (0.146) (0.159)
Average Years of Education 0.111 0.00836 0.173 0.0335 0.0699 -0.0389
(0.111) (0.0947) (0.108) (0.0942) (0.0890) (0.0998)
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC
% aged 16-35 2.822** 2.172* 2.672 2.828* 1.588 2.249
(1.368) (1.234) (1.504) (1.328) (1.554) (1.629)
% male 3.226** 3.418*** 1.903 2.650* 0.135 1.417
(1.375) (0.952) (1.899) (1.337) (1.412) (1.222)
% African 0.536 0.0580 1.105** 0.253 -0.0409 -0.707*
(0.351) (0.298) (0.364) (0.387) (0.262) (0.312)
Racial homogeneity -1.736*** -1.278*** -2.060*** -1.355** -0.540 -0.127
(0.452) (0.427) (0.511) (0.471) (0.474) (0.339)
Linquistic homogeneity 0.203 -0.0365 0.333 0.100 -0.139 -0.114
(0.302) (0.229) (0.280) (0.125) (0.241) (0.173)
Population -0.168* -0.124 -0.135** -0.146** -0.0333 -0.0631*
(0.102) (0.0843) (0.0548) (0.0551) (0.0578) (0.0277)
Population density 0.0768 -0.0221 0.0410 -0.0184 -0.0198 -0.0299
(0.0777) (0.0532) (0.0629) (0.0563) (0.0309) (0.0272)
Two year Lagged Property Crime rate 0.488***
(0.118)
Two year Lagged Violent Crime rate 0.499***
(0.105)
INFRASTRUCTURAL 
Stations per capita 0.0324*** 0.0236** 0.0464*** 0.0249* 0.0132 0.000162
(0.00968) (0.00999) (0.0101) (0.0111) (0.00809) (0.0109)
Proxy for Service delivery -0.858 -0.971 -0.547 -0.565 -0.411 -0.307
(0.868) (0.684) (1.072) (0.891) (0.627) (0.429)
Constant 7.413*** 8.200*** 6.880*** 8.104*** 4.086* 4.533*
(1.499) (1.550) (1.356) (1.467) (2.052) (2.152)
Observations 255 255 255 255 153 153
R-squared 0.722 0.756 0.606 0.540 0.805 0.794
Number of prov 9 9 9 9
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1












Firstly, all coefficients become insignificant when controlling for the respective lagged 
crime rate. However, it is important to note that the sample size is dramatically reduced 
from 255 to 153 observations. Although, the sign on income is negative under all 
specifications, it is only significant at the five percent level for property crimes, with a 
coefficient of around -0.21. Aggregate unemployment3 has no significant relationship with 
either crime index. Nevertheless, to investigate this relationship further, unemployment is 
split by age in table 5.  
The Theil index is used as the measure for inequality, because of its ability to decompose 
inequality into the within- and between-components. Using this measure, no significant 
relation between inequality and crime is found; however, the sign of the coefficient is 
consistently positive. In table 4 inequality is broken into a within- and between-race 
component, to examine this relationship closer. Despite education having no significant 
relationship with crime, its sign is consistently positive under the first two specifications.   
The percentage of people aged between 16 and 35 and th  percentage of males in a district 
have large positive coefficients, with both being significant for property crime and only the 
percentage of males being significant for violent crime when looking across all districts. 
However, when comparing within provinces, these coefficients lose their significance.  
Regarding race, looking within provinces, a percentage point increase in the percentage of 
Africans in a district is associated with a 1.105 percent increase in the number property 
crimes per capita. Racial homogeneity has a large significant negative correlation on both 
crime indices, although, the findings show the relationship is stronger with property crime. 
The index of linguistic homogeneity is found to have no significant correlation.  
Interestingly, population density has no significant relation to either crime rate. However, 
when looking with provinces, holding all else constant, on average the more people in a 
district, the lower the crime rate.  
The number of police stations per capita is associated with higher property crime rates, 
though the coefficient is only significant for violent crime when looking across all districts. 
                                                












Nevertheless, the sign is consistently positive. The coefficient on the proxy for service 
delivery is consistently negative4 and found to be insignificant. 
To test for a possible non-linear relationship between average household income per capita 
and crime. A quadratic in income is included in the regression. Table three reports the 
findings; only the coefficients on the income variables are included, as all the other results 
remain largely unchanged.  
Table 3 Fixed effects regressions with a quadratic for income 
 
Column 3 and 4 represent the coefficients of the original specification with province fixed 
effects, while column 7 and 8 include the quadratic. As can be seen in the table, there is no 
evidence to suggest a non-linear relationship of this form, in fact, the inclusion of the 
income variable squared results in much larger standard errors and the loss of significance. 
Table 4 presents the decomposition of inequality into within- and between-racial groups. 
Again column 3 and 4 are the original regressions, while 9 and 10 present the regression 
with inequality broken down.  Inequality remains insignificant, with both measures falling 
outside of even the 10 percent significance level. Nevertheless, both coefficients are positive 
for violent and property crime, with between-race inequality having a much larger 
coefficient with greater significance. Average household income per capita loses its 
                                                
4 The proxy is the percentage of people having to walk to collect water for household use, thus the larger the 
percentage, the lower the level of service delivery. 











Average Household Income per capita (log) -0.210** -0.158 -1.239 -1.066
(0.0756) (0.0975) (1.685) (1.543)
Average Household Income per capita Squared 0.0920 0.0812
(0.151) (0.139)
Constant 6.880*** 8.104*** 9.788 10.67
(1.356) (1.467) (4.933) (5.000)
Observations 255 255 255 255
R-squared 0.606 0.540 0.608 0.541
Number of prov 9 9 9 9
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05












significance in column 9, along with the coefficients on population in both columns 9 and 
10.  
Table 4 Fixed effects regressions with inequality decomposed into within- and between-race components 
 
As mentioned above, the relationship between crime and unemployment is investigated in 
table 5. Unemployment is split into two rates, namely, mature unemployment, which is the 











Average Household Income per capita (log) -0.210** -0.158 -0.179* -0.106
(0.0756) (0.0975) (0.0925) (0.111)
Unemployment 0.0326 -0.318 -0.117 -0.506
(0.953) (0.765) (1.018) (0.788)
Theil index of Inequality 0.132 0.156
(0.110) (0.136)
Within Race Inequality 0.0736 0.0750
(0.108) (0.132)
Between Race Inequality 0.301 0.315
(0.242) (0.190)
Average Years of Education 0.173 0.0335 0.163 0.0168
(0.108) (0.0942) (0.110) (0.0955)
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC
% aged 16-35 2.672 2.828* 2.779 3.023*
(1.504) (1.328) (1.549) (1.344)
% male 1.903 2.650* 1.886 2.485
(1.899) (1.337) (1.936) (1.365)
% African 1.105** 0.253 1.122** 0.285
(0.364) (0.387) (0.371) (0.377)
Racial homogeneity -2.060*** -1.355** -2.012*** -1.324**
(0.511) (0.471) (0.542) (0.468)
Linquistic homogeneity 0.333 0.100 0.312 0.0689
(0.280) (0.125) (0.315) (0.151)
Population -0.135** -0.146** -0.124* -0.126*
(0.0548) (0.0551) (0.0601) (0.0568)
Population density 0.0410 -0.0184 0.0402 -0.0215
(0.0629) (0.0563) (0.0650) (0.0571)
INFRASTRUCTURAL
Stations per capita 0.0464*** 0.0249* 0.0462*** 0.0256*
(0.0101) (0.0111) (0.0104) (0.0111)
Proxy for Service delivery -0.547 -0.565 -0.438 -0.411
(1.072) (0.891) (1.038) (0.850)
Constant 6.880*** 8.104*** 6.586*** 7.688***
(1.356) (1.467) (1.414) (1.516)
Observations 255 255 253 253
R-squared 0.606 0.540 0.611 0.548
Number of prov 9 9 9 9
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1












unemployment rate for those above the age of 25, and youth unemployment5, which is 
defined as the percentage of people unemployed between the ages of 15 and 25. Inequality 
remains decomposed.  
Table 5 Fixed effects regressions with unemployment split into mature and youth rates 
 
                                                
5 As defined by the International Labour Organisation  











Average Household Income per capita (log) -0.179* -0.106 -0.233** -0.146
(0.0925) (0.111) (0.0953) (0.119)
Unemployment -0.117 -0.506
(1.018) (0.788)
Mature Unemployment -2.235* -1.924*
(0.989) (0.906)
Youth Unemployment 1.786*** 1.195**
(0.401) (0.384)
Within Race Inequality 0.0736 0.0750 0.122 0.110
(0.108) (0.132) (0.0954) (0.121)
Between Race Inequality 0.301 0.315 0.395 0.379*
(0.242) (0.190) (0.226) (0.172)
Average Years of Education 0.163 0.0168 0.238** 0.0726
(0.110) (0.0955) (0.0776) (0.0730)
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC
% aged 16-35 2.779 3.023* 2.769* 2.988**
(1.549) (1.344) (1.316) (1.128)
% male 1.886 2.485 0.805 1.694*
(1.936) (1.365) (1.107) (0.818)
% African 1.122** 0.285 1.492*** 0.550
(0.371) (0.377) (0.398) (0.434)
Racial homogeneity -2.012*** -1.324** -2.072*** -1.369**
(0.542) (0.468) (0.535) (0.472)
Linquistic homogeneity 0.312 0.0689 0.436 0.160
(0.315) (0.151) (0.324) (0.142)
Population -0.124* -0.126* -0.104 -0.111
(0.0601) (0.0568) (0.0674) (0.0637)
Population density 0.0402 -0.0215 0.0218 -0.0350
(0.0650) (0.0571) (0.0673) (0.0580)
INFRASTRUCTURAL
Stations per capita 0.0462*** 0.0256* 0.0416*** 0.0223*
(0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0101) (0.0109)
Proxy for Service delivery -0.438 -0.411 0.161 0.0371
(1.038) (0.850) (0.782) (0.673)
Constant 6.586*** 7.688*** 6.266*** 7.450***
(1.414) (1.516) (1.245) (1.434)
Observations 253 253 253 253
R-squared 0.611 0.548 0.669 0.593
Number of prov 9 9 9 9
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1












Youth unemployment has a large significant positive coefficient for property and violent 
crime, suggesting that there is, in fact, a relationship between crime and unemployment. 
For a one-percentage point increase in youth unemployment, property and violent crimes 
will increase by about 1.8 and 1.2 percent respectively. The coefficient on mature 
unemployment is insignificant at the five percent level, however it has a large negative 
coefficient for both property and violent crime.  
After controlling for youth unemployment and mature unemployment separately, the 
coefficient on the income variable becomes significant for property crime again at -0.233. 
While, the coefficient on percentage of young becomes significant for violent crime. For a 
one-percentage point increase in the percentage of people aged between 15 and 35, there is 
almost a three percent increase in the number of violent crimes per capita.  
The coefficients on racial homogeneity for both indices and the coefficients on percentage 














This section provides a discussion of the results presented in the section V, as well as 
highlighting the caveats considered in the research.  
Economic 
Contrary to Demombynes and Özler’s (2005) finding of a strong positive relationship 
between mean household expenditure and property crime and a significant non-linear 
relationship with violent crime, this research only finds a negative correlation between 
income and property crime. This finding is consistent with the theory that aggregate 
income acts as a proxy for the opportunity costs associated with committing crime.  
Surprisingly, the results show no significant relationship between either crime index and 
inequality. This is unlike the findings of Imrohoroglu et al. (2004), who find that inequality 
is one of the largest determinants of property crime in the USA, and Fajnzylber et al. 
(2002), who find that it is associated with violent crime, globally. Even after decomposing 
inequality into within- and between-racial groups, there is still no significant relation.  
However, unlike Demombynes and Özler (2005), who find that the within component is 
more important, the author finds that the between component has a more significant 
relationship with crime, albeit below he five percent level. It is important to note that 
income may not provide a good measure of wealth; therefore not revealing the true 
relationship between crime and inequality.  
In line with the literature (Demombynes and Özler, 2005; Imrohoroglu et al., 2004), 
aggregate unemployment is not found to have a significant relationship with violent or 
property crime. However, after splitting unemployment into youth and mature 
unemployment, youth unemployment emerges as highly significant, particularly for 
property crimes. This is consistent with the assertion that there are lower opportunity 
costs for the unemployed. Surprisingly mature unemployment is found to have a negative 
relationship with both indices; however, this is finding is only significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
Despite Lochner’s (2004) assertion that education is an important determinant of crime, 












relationship seen in Figure 2 is likely cofounded by education’s correlation to other 
variables. 
Sociodemographic 
The relationship between the percentage of young people does not emerge as clearly as it 
does in Demombynes and Özler’s (2005) findings. When looking across the entire country, 
having more young people living in a district is associated with a higher property crime 
rate. However, when comparing within provinces, this becomes insignificant, perhaps 
suggesting that the initial relationship was controlling for the socio-geographic structure of 
the country, as well as youth unemployment. Only after controlling for youth 
unemployment, do we see a strong correlation with violent crime.  
Looking across all districts in South Africa, the results show a very large positive 
relationship between males and crime, in particular violent crime. This significance falls 
away when looking within provinces. However, this is a result of the lack of variation in 
the gender composition of districts within provinces. Despite this, the initial findings are 
harmonious with the assertion that males are the main perpetrators of crime. 
Despite its categorisation, race may be an economic indicator, as well as a 
sociodemographic factor. Within provinces, a higher percentage of Africans in a district is 
associated with a higher level of property crimes, but does not have an effect on violent 
crime. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a stronger financial social network may 
cushion economic misfortune.  
One of the most robust results is that, holding all else constant; on average a more racially 
homogenous district will have fewer property and violent crimes per capita. The coefficient 
is particularly large for property crimes. This is consistent with the hypothesis that people 
of one group are more willing to commit a crime against someone belonging to another 
patent group. It is disturbing that this is true for violent crimes, where there is not 
necessarily a direct pecuniary payoff associated with committing the crime.  
That being said, this result should be interpreted with caution, as it is possible that the 
index is not controlling for racial relations, but instead providing a proxy for wealth 
inequality, even after controlling for income inequality. Furthermore, there is no evidence 













The number of police stations per capita in a district is associated with more property 
crimes per capita. The final regression indicates that for every additional police station per 
100 000 people, holding all else constant, there will be on average a four percent increase in 
property crimes per capita. This finding is likely the result of an endogeneity problem, 
similar to that found by Levitt (1997). To test whether there is in fact an endogeneity 
problem, a better measure of policing would first need to be found, and unfortunately, the 
SAPS does not release statistics on the number of officers or spending per police station. 
The proxy for other service delivery, the percentage of households who needed to collect 
water for household use, yielded no significant relationship. Providing no evidence that 
service delivery is directly associated with individual based property and violent crime. 
There are two additional caveats to the research worth mentioning. Firstly, a social 
mobility measure is excluded, which is likely to be an important economic factor. 
Demombynes and Özler (2005) conjecture that social mobility is likely an important 
determinant, as the lack of upward social movement results in social unrest and tension. 
The reason a measure of social mobility was not included is that, with only five years of 
data, any direct measure looking at a reasonable time to expect social movement would 
result in a major reduction in this study’s sample size.  
Secondly, there may be a reporting bias, in that crime is more likely to be reported by 
some groups. For example, the wealthy may be more likely to report property crimes, as 
they are required to do so for insurance purposes or as they have a higher level of the 
understanding of what constitutes a criminal offence. Moreover, people living in high crime 
areas may become discouraged with the police and may be less likely to report crime.  
However, the coefficient on our income variable does offer support for this. If there is a 
reporting bias, then the coefficient reports a lower bound and underestimates the 
relationship. Furthermore, Demombynes and Özler test for this and find that it does not 













This study set out to investigate the relationship between economic, sociodemographic and 
infrastructural factors and crime rates. The study uses pooled OLS and a fixed effects 
model to estimate a reduced form specification for aggregate crime rates in South African 
districts. The results uncover previously unfound links, reinforce current theory and 
findings, as well as reject others.   
The previously unfound link between unemployment and crime in South Africa emerges 
after splitting unemployment by age group. Youth unemployment is an important factor 
associated with crime, particularly property crimes; for a one-percentage point increase in 
youth unemployment, a district can expect a 1.79 percent increase in property crime. 
Unlike other studies, no significant relationship is found between inequality and crime 
when using the Theil index on average household income per capita, even after 
decomposing into between- and within- racial group components.  
However, a significant relationship between racial homogeneity within a district and crime 
is found, in particular property crime. We suggest caution in interpreting this result as an 
indication of racial tension and that instead that it is possibly a result of the measure 
acting as a close proxy for wealth inequality. Furthermore, the percentage of Africans in a 
district is positively correlated with property crime, supporting the hypothesis on 
financially supportive social networks. We find that age and gender are important, with 
districts with more people between the age of 15 and 35 and a higher percentage of males 
experiencing higher violent crime rates.  
Lastly, a positive relationship between our measure of policing and crime suggests that 
there is an endogeneity problem. To establish the effectiveness of policing on crime, further 
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- Merge LFS 1 
o This do-file merges the 5 waves of the LFS data. The code in this file was 
adapted from a do-file from the Development Policy Research Unit at the 
School of Economics at the University of Cape Town  
o The district councils are recoded in this file 
- Data cleaning 1 and 2 
o These files combine the crime statistics (already converted from PDF into 
excel format) downloaded from the SAPS website and reshape the data into 
a usable format 
- Generate DC 
o This do-file recodes the station IDs to match their respective District 
Councils 
- Merging LFS and Stations 
o The station data are merged with the LFS data, one to many  
Variable generation 
- Precollapse variable generation 
o Economic, sociodemographic and infrastructural variables are generated in 
this file 
- Generating inequality index 
o This file is referenced in the “Precollapse variable generation” do-file. This do-
file generates the Theil indices using a while loop. It then generates the Theil 
indices for Districts, which have insufficient people in certain racial groups. 
- Collapsing data 
o The merged data generated is collapsed into district councils. The indices of 
racial and linguistic homogeneity are generated, as well as population 
variables. The dependent variables are converted into per capita form and 
logged. 
- Generate Data 
o This do-file just runs all previous do-files. 
Analysis 
- Descriptive stats 
o This file generates the scatterplots used in section IV 
- regressions 
o The regressions output used in section V is generated in this do-file 
 
 
 
